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I. INTRODUCTION
Criminal prohibitions against consensual acts can be found in many legal
systems.  In the German penal code (Strafgesetzbuch), relevant provisions
can be found, for instance, in sections 172, 173, 216, 228 StGB.1  But,  
*  © 2017 Kapsaski Ifigeneia, Ph.D. candidate, Free University of Berlin.  
1. According to Section 172 of the German Penal Code, “[w]hosoever contracts a
marriage although he is already married, or whosoever contracts a marriage with a married 
person, shall be liable to imprisonment not exceeding three years or a fine.”  STRAFGESETZBUCH
[STGB] [PENAL CODE], § 172, translation at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/
englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html#p1502 [https://perma.cc/4R83-FUHZ] (Ger.).  Section
173 refers to the crime of incest—sexual intercourse among relatives—and will be examined
in detail below.  Section 173(1) requires that “[w]hosoever performs an act of sexual intercourse 
with a consanguine descendant shall be liable to imprisonment not exceeding three years 
or a fine.” Id.  Section 216(1)—Killing at the request of the victim; mercy killing—states:
“If a person is induced to kill by the express and earnest request of the victim the penalty
shall be imprisonment from six months to five years.” Id. § 216, para. 1. Finally, Section 
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given the centrality of personal autonomy in liberal democracies and the 
prevalence of the Harm Principle2 as the main principle for the justification 
of criminal sanctions, are such criminal provisions justifiable from the
perspective of a liberal criminal law theory? 
Consent has a central role in criminal law as a waiver of rights through 
its double function as an inculpatory element of the actus reus—the
absence of consent as an element of the definition of the offense—and an 
exculpatory role as a defense to a prima facie criminal wrong.  This liberal 
consent-based approach would render these criminal provisions unjustifiable,
unless other normative standards are deployed that go beyond the traditional 
version of the Harm Principle3 or even the principle of autonomy.  Joel 
Feinberg defines harm as a wrongful setback to welfare interests.4 However, 
instead of focusing solely on welfare interests to grant protective rights, 
one could pass from welfarism to autonomy and regard violations of autonomy
as wrongful and therefore punishable even if they are not harmful in the 
sense of diminishing resources.5 
One cannot grasp the full wrongfulness of consensual conduct solely on 
the grounds of harm to others—as defined by the Harm Principle—or as 
a breach of autonomy.  This Article proposes an interest-based dignity principle 
that goes beyond harm and autonomy, but, at the same time, would develop
those concepts within an interest-based theory of rights. 
228 renders bodily harm punishable, notwithstanding consent of the victim, when the act
violates public policy. See id. § 228. 
2. The Harm Principle was first advocated by John Stuart Mill.  See JOHN STUART
MILL, ON LIBERTY (Ticknor & Fields, 2d ed. 1863) (1859).  Under Mill’s version of the 
Harm Principle, “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any 
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own 
good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.”  Id. at 23.  Joel Feinberg recognizes
other good reasons for criminalization, such as the offense principle and a soft version of 
legal paternalism. See JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 11–12 (1984). According to Feinberg,
the offense principle seeks to prevent people from wrongfully offending others as a reason 
for coercive legislation. Id. at 26.
3. As identified by Feinberg, these include the offense principle, legal paternalism
and legal moralism. See FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 2, at 26.  Feinberg argues 
against both legal moralism and legal paternalism as setting legitimate grounds for 
criminalization and moral limits to criminal law. See JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF 23– 
26 (1986).  However, it is noteworthy that Feinberg recognizes other evils, such as “free­
floating evils” or “non-grievance evils.” See JOEL FEINBERG, Preface to HARMLESS WRONGDOING
323 (1988) (recognizing that the “need to prevent evil is always a relevant reason in support of
a criminal prohibition,” but also explaining that “non-grievance evils . . . particularly the 
free floating ones, never—well, hardly ever—are good reasons, and perhaps never are decisive
ones.”). 
4. See FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 2, at 37–38. 
5. See, e.g., Guido Pincione, Welfare, Autonomy, and Contractual Freedom, in
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 214, 214 (Mark White ed., 2009) 
(explaining the theories of welfarism and autonomy in contract law). 
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Under an interest-based approach of human rights, there is a list of vital 
interests, which all individuals share by virtue of their humanity, that must
be protected.6  Under a perfectionist conception of human rights, the state 
cannot remain neutral against the various conceptions of good and must 
reject those that would not promote these vital interests.7  This means that 
the state may need to restrict freedom to promote other goods that might 
be central to our humanity.  A vital interest that is central to our humanity
is the interest not to be severely humiliated, or otherwise, not be subjected
to degrading or inhumane treatment; to be objectified and treated as a 
means. Only under a holistic and coherent theory of human rights can we 
fully understand the wrongfulness of the conduct. 
This Article addresses the issue of protecting human dignity as a ground 
and a threshold for criminalization.  Human dignity can be either a limit 
to the scope of criminal law or a reason that justifies criminalization.8 
This inquiry will be conducted through the referral to two German cases 
regarding consensual conduct.  The first concerns consensual maiming and 
killing of a person and the second concerns consensual incest between two
adult siblings. 
This Article does not further examine questions on the ontology of consent; 
neither does it examine questions regarding validity of consent as rational and
voluntary.  The issue discussed here concerns the case where consent cannot 
serve as a waiver of the right protected. This clearly shows that there is a
distinct core of wrongdoing, which consists in the violation of human
dignity and goes beyond the violation of autonomy rights.9
 6. See, e.g., John Tasioulas, On the Foundations of Human Rights, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 45, 53–54 (Rowan Cruft et al. eds., 2015) (describing an
“interest-based theory which regards the interests in question as generative of human rights 
in crucial part because they are the interests of human beings who possess equal moral 
status”).
7. See Steven Wall, Perfectionism in Moral and Political Philosophy, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perfectionism-moral/#PriStaNeu 
(last updated Oct. 10, 2012) (defining theories of perfectionism in Section 1, and explaining
how perfectionism proponents reject any constraints on the State when it comes to
promoting the good in Section 3.1). 
8. See, e.g., Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, Drugs, Dignity and Danger: Human
Dignity as a Constitutional Constraint to Limit Overcriminalization, 80 TENN. L. REV. 305,
344 (2013).
9. See Daniel Sulmasy, Dignity and Bioethics: History, Theory, and Selected Applications, 
in HUMAN DIGNITY AND BIOETHICS: ESSAYS COMMISSIONED BY THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL
ON BIOETHICS (Mar. 2008), https://bioethicsarchive.georgetown.edu/pcbe/reports/human_ 
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However, human dignity cannot be regarded solely as an objective value,
which takes priority over autonomy rights, but rather as an independent value 
to autonomy based on the subjective right not to be severely humiliated. 
II. THE ROLE OF CONSENT IN GERMAN CRIMINAL LAW
The case of Armin Meiwes, the notorious “Rotenburg Hannibal,” is a 
well-known one in German criminal case law.10  Another notorious case
in Germany has been the case of Stübing v. Germany, which has been a
landmark case before the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany (BVerfGE) 
and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).11 
dignity/chapter18.html [https://perma.cc/T624-YABP] (refuting the notion that human
“dignity is a ‘useless concept,’ reducible to respect for autonomy”).
10. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct.
7, 2008, 2 BvR 578/07, https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/ 
DE/2008/10/rk20081007_2bvr057807.html [https://perma.cc/3BJK-R5M6].  The facts of 
the case were summarized in the Guardian:
In March 2001, Meiwes advertised on the internet for a ‘young well-built man, 
who wanted to be eaten.’  Brandes replied.  On the evening of March 9, the two
men went up to the bedroom in Meiwes’ rambling timbered farmhouse. Mr. 
Brandes swallowed 20 sleeping tablets and half a bottle of schnapps before
Meiwes cut off Brandes’ penis, with his agreement, and fried it for both of them
to eat. Brandes—by this stage bleeding heavily—then took a bath, while Meiwes
read a Star Trek novel.  In the early hours of the morning, he finished off his 
victim by stabbing him in the neck with a large kitchen knife, kissing him first. 
The cannibal then chopped Mr. Brandes into pieces and put several bits of him 
in his freezer, next to a takeaway pizza, and buried the skull in his garden. Over 
the next few weeks, he defrosted and cooked parts of Mr. Brandes in olive oil 
and garlic, eventually consuming 20kg of human flesh before police finally
turned up at his door. 
Luke Harding, Victim of Cannibal Agreed to be Eaten, GUARDIAN (Dec. 3, 2003, 9:33 
PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/dec/04/germany.lukeharding [https://perma.cc/ 
N5G3-8PSM].
11. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 
26, 2008, 2 BvR 392/07; see also Stubing v. Germany, (2012) 55 E.H.R.R. 24, App. No. 
43547/2008. The 28-year-old Patrick Stübing was sentenced to more than two years in 
prison by the criminal court in Leipzig for having a sexual relationship with his younger
sister Susan K. The two siblings had grown up separately in children’s shelters and foster 
families after their parents’ divorce following Susan’s birth.  They both grew up under 
difficult circumstances, each unaware of the other’s existence.  In 2000, the defendant, 
then twenty-four years old, got in contact with his mother and then met his sister, who was 
sixteen years old at the time.  Starting in January 2001, after their mother’s death, Patrick
Stübing and Susan K. had consensual sexual intercourse, leading to the birth of four
children, two of them being handicapped and three of them living with foster parents.  The 
first child was born when Susan was seventeen years old. See Dietmar Hipp, German
High Court Takes a Look at Incest, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Mar. 11, 2008, 6:36 PM),
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/dangerous-love-german-high-court-takes-a­
look-at-incest-a-540831.html [https://perma.cc/WE7Z-AGFY].  The criminal court did
not impose a sentence on Susan K.  See STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], § 173,
404
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Both cases share the element of consent.  In the first case, the harm
inflicted upon the victim was a harm that the victim himself had agreed 
upon with the defendant.12  In the second case, there was no actual victim
who could have consented to the punishable act, but instead there was a
punishable consensual sexual intercourse between adult siblings, which 
therefore constitutes a victimless crime.13 
para. 3, translation at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb. 
html#p1502 [https://perma.cc/4R83-FUHZ] (Ger.) (“Descendants and siblings shall not
be liable pursuant to this provision if they were not yet eighteen years of age at the time 
of the act.”). The court described her as a timid, dependent young woman with a light
mental disability, reducing her culpability.  The defendant filed a constitutional complaint 
challenging the constitutionality of Section 173 of the Penal Code.  The majority opinion— 
seven of eight judges—concluded that the prohibition against incest is constitutional, and
only the dissenting Judge Hassemer came to a different result.  With regard to the specific
case, the issue of protection of minors played a role because Susan K. was not a legal
adult—that is, she was less than eighteen years old—at the beginning of their sexual
relationship. The Court examined whether the criminal prohibition against adult sibling
incest interferes with liberty rights within article 2(1) of the German Constitution, and
namely the rights that protect the most private, intimate sphere of liberty. The Court
argued there is no absolute protection and that the restriction of such a liberty right serves 
the legitimate aim of the protection of others or the general public under the condition that 
the principle of proportionality is also respected. 
12. It is remarkable that the lower court, the District Court of Kassel, convicted 
Meiwes for manslaughter, rejecting his claim that he should be only convicted under the 
lower offense of “mercy killing” under § 216 of the German Penal Code.  STRAFGESETZBUCH
[STGB] [PENAL CODE], § 216, para. 1, translation at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/ 
englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html#p1502 [https://perma.cc/4R83-FUHZ] (Ger.) (“If a person is
induced to kill by the express and earnest request of the victim the penalty shall be
imprisonment from six months to five years.”). The German Supreme Court reversed the 
ruling, and Meiwes was convicted of murder under § 211 of the German Penal Code by
the District Court of Frankfurt.  Id. § 211, para. 2 (“A murderer under this provision is any
person who kills a person for pleasure, sexual gratification, out of greed or otherwise base 
motives, by stealth or cruelty or by means that pose a danger to the public or in order to 
facilitate or to cover up another offence.”). 
13. 	  Under Section 173 of the German Penal Code regulating the offense of incest, 
Whosoever performs an act of sexual intercourse with a consanguine relative in 
an ascending line shall be liable to imprisonment not exceeding two years or a 
fine; this shall also apply if the relationship as a relative has ceased to exist.
Consanguine siblings who perform an act of sexual intercourse with each other
shall incur the same penalty.
Id. § 173, para. 2.  In this case, neither the Federal Constitutional Court nor the European 
Court of Human Rights overturned the criminal convictions, insisting on the legality
of criminalization of consensual adult incest between siblings.  However, from the perspective 
of criminal law theory, the question whether there are really convincing reasons to criminalize
adult incest remains open.
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It is also noteworthy that in both crimes, consent—or more precisely,
the absence of consent—plays no role in the definition of the offense as 
an element of the actus reus.  This means that both types of conduct are
considered prima facie wrongful and consent could possibly act as a 
defense if we accept the priority of the principle―Volenti non fit injuria.14 
According to this principle, the conduct, even if harmful, does not
constitute a wrong, since no wrongful violation of the autonomy rights of 
the victim has taken place.
However, this was not the case in none of the aforementioned decisions. 
In both of these cases there has been a conviction, regardless of the fact
of consent. In the first case, there has been a conviction of murder under
specific aggravated circumstances and in the second case, a conviction for
incest without considering the voluntary engagement of all actors.
Irrespective of whether the two decisions could be considered as erroneous
due to the total disregard of the existence of consent, it is still worth examining 
what would distinguish the two cases had the court taken into account the 
consent of the victim. 
The distinction lies in the different roles of consent in criminal law.
These different roles of consent are linked with the definition of wrongfulness 
and its relation to harm.  To wrong another means to violate his or her 
moral or legal rights, to violate their autonomy, which would mean to cross 
their moral or legal boundaries without their consent, as Larry Alexander 
points out in The Ontology of Consent.15 This could mean that either the
punishable conduct is prima facie wrongful16 and consent serves as a 
defense or justification of the prima facie wrong (exculpatory role of consent), 
or that the conduct is not even prima facie wrongful17 because it does not 
violate a prohibitory norm; but the absence of consent can transform the
otherwise non-wrongful conduct to a wrongful one, acquiring, thus, an
inculpatory role in the definition of the actus reus of the offense.18  In the 
14. Meaning, “a person is not wronged by that to which he consents.” See, e.g.,
Vera Bergelson, Consent to Harm, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT 165 (Franklin G. Miller &
Alan Werthheimer eds., 2010). Joel Feinberg is committed to the Volenti maxim as a
foundational principle in criminal law.  See FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 2, at
115–17. 
15. See Larry Alexander, The Ontology of Consent, 55 ANALYTIC PHIL. 102 (2014);
see also Bergelson, supra note 14, at 122.  However, an inquiry into the ontology of consent is
not within the objectives of the current paper.
16. See Bergelson, supra note 14, at 115. 
17. See LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY
275 (2009), in which the authors argue that without consent there is not even a legally
protected interest. 
18. See Bergelson, supra note 14, at 116. 
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first case, the conduct is per se evil or regrettable,19 and thus it needs consent
as a justification in order for the perpetrator to be exculpated.  This is the 
case in the crimes of murder or physical injury.  There is a prohibitory
norm, a moral imperative which prohibits people from killing or injuring 
others. In the case of having sex, or transporting things or people, there 
is no such norm that would ban all these activities altogether because they
are not regrettable in themselves;20 only under certain circumstances they
would qualify as wrongful conduct.21 These circumstances are defined in the
actus reus of the offense, and the absence of consent, as one of these 
circumstances, renders a conduct wrongful that would otherwise be morally
neutral.22  Consensual conduct, in this sense, is not even prima facie wrongful. 
The role of consent—more precisely, the absence of consent—in this case
is, thus, inculpatory.
The conclusions drawn are also reflected in the offenses of the German 
penal code. A typical example of the inculpatory role of consent is the offense 
of rape under Section 177 of the German penal code,23 which requires 
19. See FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING, supra note 3, at 17–18, defining evil 
in the most generic sense as any occurrence or state of affairs that is rather seriously to be 
regretted.
20. See Heidi M. Hurd, The Moral Magic of Consent, 2 LEGAL THEORY 121, 123 
(1996), where she argues that “consent can function to transform the morality of another’s 
conduct—to make an action right when it would otherwise be wrong.”  She uses several 
examples: “consent turns a trespass into a dinner party; a battery into a handshake; a theft 
into a gift; an invasion of privacy into an intimate moment; a commercial appropriation of
name and likeness into a biography.” Id.
 21. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 568 (1978).
22. See Bergelson, supra note 14, at 116. 
23. Section 177 of the German Penal Code—sexual assault by use of force or 
threats; rape—provides that 
Whosoever coerces another person (1) by force, (2) by threat of imminent danger
to life or limb, or (3) by exploiting a situation in which the victim is unprotected
and at the mercy of the offender, to suffer sexual acts by the offender or a third 
person on their own person or to engage actively in sexual activity with the
offender or a third person, shall be liable to imprisonment of not less than one
year.
STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], § 177, para. 1, translation at https://www.
gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html#p1502 [https://perma.cc/4R83­
FUHZ] (Ger.).  Section 177 also provides for additional penalties in serious cases:
In especially serious cases the penalty shall be imprisonment of not less than two
years. An especially serious case typically occurs if (1) the offender performs sexual
intercourse with the victim or performs similar sexual acts with the victim, or 
allows them to be performed on himself by the victim, especially if they degrade
 407


























   
  
 
    
either force or threat of danger to life or exploitation of situation of dependence, 
all of which imply the absence of the valid consent of the victim of rape. 
By contrast, the offense of causing bodily harm of Section 233 requires 
no such element of force. The same applies to the offense of murder under 
Section 211 of the German penal code.  The reason that the absence of
consent does not constitute an element of the actus reus in bodily harm or 
murder consists in the fact that this conduct is deemed prima facie wrongful. 
This already lights up our case.  While in the case of Armin Meiwes the
element of consent of the victim could act only as a defense or justification 
of the perpetrator’s conduct, in the case of consensual sexual intercourse 
between adult siblings, there should be no wrongful conduct at all.  This 
can be explained by the fact that there are some kinds of conduct that, 
although they are deemed immoral, should not be criminalized because 
they are simply not the law’s business. 24 However, this has not been the
decision of the lawmaker under Section 173 of the German criminal code, 
defining the offense of incest. 
More specifically, section 173 of the German Criminal Code criminalizes 
sexual intercourse between siblings without any requirement of force or 
threat of danger or exploitation that exists in rape, although consensual 
sexual intercourse is not deemed prima facie wrongful.  This creates a 
paradox because it allows for the criminalization of consensual sexual
intercourse between adult siblingsassuming that the consent given is
validwhereas consensual infliction of pain or physical injuries could 
amount as no wrong at the end, due to the justification of consent.25 One 
could question the validity of the arguments in favor of the criminalization 
of incest. The German Federal Constitutional Court invoked several arguments 
in favor of the criminalization based on the protection of public goods, 
which are going to be discussed further in the next chapter.  The ECtHR
on the other hand, grounded its argumentation mostly on the public morals 
the victim or if they entail penetration of the body (rape), or (2) the offence is 
committed jointly by more than one person.
Id. § 177, para. 2.  Finally, subsections (3), (4) and (5) provide additional stipulations on 
sentencing depending on aggravating or mitigating circumstances.  Id. § 177, para. 3–5. 
24. See  THE WOLFENDEN REPORT: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMOSEXUAL
OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION (Authorized Am. ed. 1963) (“Unless a deliberate attempt is 
to be made by society, acting through the agency of the law, to equate the sphere of crime 
with that of sin, there must remain a realm of private morality and immorality which is, in
brief and crude terms, not the law’s business.  To say this is not to condone or encourage 
private immorality.”). 
25. See section 228 of the German Penal Code, which provides that “[w]hosoever
causes bodily harm with the consent of the victim shall be deemed to act lawfully unless 
the act violates public policy, the consent notwithstanding.”  STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] 
[PENAL CODE], § 228, translation at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/
englisch_stgb.html#p1502 [https://perma.cc/4R83-FUHZ] (Ger.). 
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clause under Article 8, paragraph 2 of the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR),26 paving the way for the protection of morals to serve as 
a legitimate aim for criminalization, prohibiting conduct that is inherently
immoral—as a free-floating evil—and allowing feelings of disgust or
societal taboos to serve as grounds for criminalization under a narrow
version of legal moralism.
If the Harm Principle in its traditional form cannot grasp the whole 
range of wrongdoing, it is important to provide other principled moral 
limits to criminal law and to set a threshold that the state cannot transgress 
while pursuing various conceptions of the good.  In this way, criminal law 
could retain a moral content without turning moralistic. 
This could be achieved by endorsing a theory of perfectionist liberalism,
which would require the appeal to a perfectionist Harm Principle grounded
on a reason-based morality. The liberal principles would be then safeguarded,
but at the same time autonomy would not be the primary value to be 
fostered by criminal law, but it would be one value central to our humanity 
together with other values, such as human dignity.
Before examining this alternative, it is important to stress the centrality 
of autonomy as a value to be protected through criminal law.  A harmful 
setback to interests does not suffice, under any criminal law theory to justify
criminalization without the violation of the autonomy of the victim.  On
the contrary, violation of the autonomy of the victim counts as wrongful,
even without harm, due to the centrality of autonomy in liberal conceptions 
of human agency. 
Joel Feinberg in Harmless Wrongdoing defines the sense of harm as the 
overlap of harm and wrong.27  This means that only setbacks of interests
that are wrongs, and wrongs that are setbacks to interest, count as harms 
under the Harm Principle.28  But how would the Harm Principle justify 
the criminalization of these kinds of conduct in a liberal democracy?  By 
26. Article 8, paragraph 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights includes 
the Public Morals as a limitation clause of the right to private life [Stubing v. Germany,
(2012) 55 E.H.R.R. 24, App. No. 43547/2008]. The interpretation of this clause has been
mostly associated with the margin of appreciation of the Member States.  See also Handyside
v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5493/72, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 48 (1976) (“By reason of their 
direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries, State authorities are 
in principle in a better position than the international judge to give an opinion on the exact 
content of these requirements as well as on the ‘necessity’ of a ‘restriction’ or ‘penalty’ 
intended to meet them.”).
27. See FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING, supra note 3, at 36. 
28. FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 2, at 36. 
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inflicting blame through criminal sanctions, the state interferes with important
rights of the person, such as liberty rights or property rights, thus requiring
specific justification in order to be legitimate.
The most prominent theory of criminalization in German criminal law 
doctrine is the theory of legally protected interests (die Rechtsgutslehre),
which could be considered as a variant of the Harm Principle.  This theory
has been developed as a safeguard for individual freedom in political society, 
thus restricting governments when they interfere coercively with individual 
rights.  Under this principle, the state cannot coercively interfere with individual 
liberty, unless it does so in order to prevent harm or risk of harm to these 
legally protected interests.
The idea of the legally protected interest or legal good (Rechtsgut) goes 
back to the 19th Century and imposed principled limits to the criminal 
law.29 Under this doctrine, criminalization is a legitimate goal in order to
serve the protection of a legal good.  Under a new, refined version of the
doctrine, these legal goods can be either individual or collective goods.30 
According to other scholars, these legal goods can refer either to persons 
or to material things, but not to abstract ideas.31 At this point, one could see 
the correspondence of the doctrine of the legally protected interests to the 
Harm Principle because harm to legally protected interests could be the
equivalent of the setback to interests under the Harm Principle of Joel Feinberg. 
However, since there is no detailed list of legal goods in German criminal
law doctrine, it remains unclear whether these goods can be overridden
by other considerations.32 
Since these legally protected interests can be either individual or collective,
the state has the right to coercively interfere with individual liberty in order
to promote public goods.  The Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfGE) 
used this same reasoning in Stübing. This trend of the German constitutional
doctrine and the case law of the BVerfGE would be compatible with a
 29. See Carl-Friedrich Stuckenberg, The Constitutional Deficiencies of the German
Rechtsgutslehre, 3 OÑATI SOCIO-LEGAL SERIES 31, 34 (2013); see also CLAUS ROXIN, 
STRAFRECHT ALLGEMEINER TEIL 14–53 (4th ed. 2006). 
30. See, e.g., Stuckenberg, supra note 29, at 34. 
31. See Stuckenberg, supra note 29, at 34 (“The influential definition given by
Roxin (2006, § 2 margin no. 7), for instance, identifies ‘personal legal goods’ with the 
conditions considered necessary for the existence and development of a human being like 
life, health, personal liberty, property, etc.  Consequently, a criminal law provision is considered
illegitimate if its aim is the protection of something that does not count as a personal ‘legal
good’ such as public morality, religious commandments, abstract or collective interests 
(which is highly controversial) or the paternalistic prevention of self-endangerment.”). 
32. The German Federal Constitutional Court has argued, for instance, that there
are no a priori legally protected interests that could be protected outside of the context of
the German constitution. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGΕ] [Federal Constitutional 
Court] Feb. 26, 2008, 2 BvR 392/07, at 39. 
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perfectionist theory, where interests are to be balanced and can be outweighed 
by other interests or public goods.




For one to grasp the wrongfulness of crimes such as the ones described 
above, he or she could either reformulate the Harm Principle to make it 
more plausible, or abandon the harm principle altogether in favor of other 
candidates for criminalization.  Prominent scholars such as John Stuart 
Mill and Joseph Raz undertook the endeavor to establish a perfectionist 
Harm Principle, while Meir Dan-Cohen replaced the Harm Principle with
the Dignity Principle.33 For the purposes of this paper, I will focus solely 
on the perfectionist theories of Joseph Raz and his version of the Harm
Principle. 
In contrast to the principle of state neutrality, legal perfectionism claims 
that the state shall not remain neutral between different understandings of 
the nature of the good.34  Joseph Raz tried to establish a perfectionist version 
of the Harm Principle in relation to a reason-based notion of morality to 
avoid a utilitarian path in order to describe harm.  At the introduction of 
the last chapter of The Morality of Freedom, under the title Freedom and 
Politics, he talks about a moralistic doctrine of individual freedom based
on the moral value of individual liberty.  He claims that value-pluralism 
and as expressing itself in personal autonomy can and should be promoted
by political action.  This notion of reason-based morality does not simply 
consist of conventional moral beliefs, feelings of indignation or disgust in 
a given society, but it is rather an autonomy-based morality.35  Under this
perfectionist theory, it is a state’s primary duty in a liberal society to promote, 
protect, and foster the autonomy of all citizens.  Joseph Raz claims that “[s]ince 
our concern for autonomy is a concern to enable people to have a good 
life it furnishes us with reason to secure that autonomy which could be 
valuable. Providing, preserving or protecting bad options does not enable
 33. See MEIR DAN-COHEN, Defending Dignity, in HARMFUL THOUGHTS. ESSAYS ON
LAW, SELF, AND MORALITY 150, 151–57 (2002).
34. For a defense of the principle of State Neutrality, see Ronald Dworkin, Liberalism,
in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY 113, 113–143 (1978), and JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL 
LIBERALISM 191 (1993).  Under this principle, the state should be neutral among rival 
understandings of the good.  The principle of state neutrality thus articulates a principled moral 
constraint on permissible or legitimate state action. 
35. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 417 (1986). 
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one to enjoy valuable autonomy.”36  Therefore, it follows that perfectionism
is in line with the autonomy principle because only valuable autonomy and
not autonomy per se is worth pursuing.  Autonomy, in Raz’s view, requires 
that one can access an adequate range of valuable or worthwhile options. 
Thus, the state need not stay neutral between worthwhile or worthless options
that people pursue.  It is rather clear that that autonomy principle “permits 
and even requires governments to create morally valuable opportunities, and 
to eliminate repugnant ones.”37  How is this perfectionist liberalism compatible
with the endorsement of the Harm Principle as a principled limit to state
interference with autonomy? 
Raz argues that, although the state should promote worthwhile options
and eliminate repugnant or worthless options, this should not be done through
state coercion, rather through other, non-coercive measures.38  The reason 
for this limit39 lies again in the autonomy principle, for the means used,
coercive interference, violates the autonomy of the victim.  Raz argues that 
“first it violates the condition of independence and expresses a relation of 
domination and an attitude of disrespect for the coerced individual.  Second, 
coercion by criminal penalties is a global and indiscriminate invasion of
autonomy.”40 
Raz thus reformulated the Harm Principle as a principle “that regards
the prevention of harm to anyone—himself included—as the only justifiable
ground for coercive interference with a person.”41  In this sense, coercion 
as a means to prevent harm is an autonomy gain, whereas coercion to
prevent harmless immoralities is an autonomy loss.42 
The problem with this reinterpretation of the Harm Principle is that not
all coercive measures of the state express a relation of domination and an 
attitude of disrespect for the coerced individual.  Moreover, with regard
to autonomy, this version of the Harm Principle is both too broad and too
narrow for our purposes.  This can be attributed to the fact that (a) infringements
of autonomy can be wrongful and therefore there is an autonomy loss even
in cases where there is no harm in the sense of diminishing resources and
 36. Id. at 412. 
37. Id. at 417. 
38. Id.
39. It is important to stress that this is a limit concerning the means used to pursue
the good, and not relating to the duty of the state to remain neutral against various conceptions
of the good.
40. RAZ, supra note 35, at 418. 
41. Id. at 412–13. 
42. Id. at 418–19. 
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(b) not every coercive measure violates autonomy.43  The Harm Principle is
thus too sterile, even if we endorse a perfectionist view of harm. Another
problem is that this aretaic version of harm would justify self-regarding duties, 
which cannot be within the scope of criminal law, as will be examined
further. 
Having put aside this perfectionist version of the Harm Principle, one
should seek other candidates, which could justify criminal punishment.
The next candidate for criminalization endorsed in this paper is the Dignity
Principle. Dignity can serve both as a value justifying criminal coercion, 
but also as a value imposing principled limits to it. 
In chapter five of his book, Harmful Thoughts, Essays on Law, Self, and 
Morality, entitled Defending Dignity, Meir Dan-Cohen criticizes the Harm 
Principle for being both over-inclusive and under-inclusive.44 He claims
that a shift from welfarism45 to autonomyas an interest to be protected 
irrespective of any setbacks to other welfare interestsis still not enough 
to grasp the whole range of wrongdoing. He then refers to the well-known 
example of the “happy slave,” arguing that slavery constitutes a significant 
violation of dignity, although a slave might enjoy the same degree of welfare
or autonomy.  This notion of dignity is construed as independent of autonomy
and welfare and prior to both.46 
Dan-Cohen argues that, “if two people can enjoy in fact the same level 
of welfare and exercise the same degree of choice, yet one of them is a
slave while the other is not, the evil of slavery must ultimately not lie in
the ideas of autonomy or welfare.”47  Not only is dignity construed as a 
value independent of autonomy in this view, but it also always takes priority
43. For example, a requirement to wear an electronic tagging device after criminal
conviction. See John Stanton-Ife, The Limits of Law, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/law-limits/ [https://perma.cc/573Q-X5HA].
44. See DAN-COHEN, supra note 33, at 151. 
45. The traditional notion of Harm as defined by Joel Feinberg is the one which 
interprets harm as a setback to welfare interests. See FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS, supra
note 2, at ix.
46. According to this quite unrealistic scenario, this is a case of a slave, who cannot 
suffer any setback to his welfare interests and gives valid consent to being a slave. The only
way to justify the criminal prohibition of slavery would be through the dignity principle, 
as a conduct severely humiliating, which requires the complete negation of all autonomy
rights on a permanent basis.  The same applies to victimless crimes, such as virtual child 
pornography, where no actual harm to children has been caused. See DAN-COHEN, supra
note 33, at 157; Tatjana Hörnle & Mordechai Kremnitzer, Human Dignity As a Protected 
Interest in Criminal Law, 44 ISRAEL L. REV. 143, 160 (2011). 
47. DAN-COHEN, supra note 33, at 156–57. 
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over autonomy or welfare.48  Thus, it stands in a hierarchical relationship 
with other values as a core value.  This idea resembles the notion of dignity
in German Constitutional Law, not only as a subjective right, but also as 
an objective value (Objektiver Wert), which runs through the whole legal 
order and from which all other subjective rights derive.49 
Both Dan-Cohen and the German constitutional legal doctrine and case 
law endorse a Kantian notion of dignity based on the second formulation 
of the categorical imperative that persons must be treated as ends and not
merely as means (Objektformel).50  As Antony Duff argues aptly, 
if we ask why violations of autonomy should be seen as so significant, one obvious
(roughly Kantian) answer is that they constitute serious, criminalizable wrongs
because they radically deny, or fail to respect, the victim’s humanity. Autonomy
is, from this liberal perspective, a central value (a right to be respected, as well as
a good to be fostered) because it is central to our humanity, which is itself the 
ground of our moral standing and of our moral claims on the respect and concern 
of others (hence the centrality of Kant’s demand that we respect “humanity”).51 
However, this Kantian conception of human dignity based on the 
impermissibility of using another as a means, can be either too narrow or 
too broad for the objectives of criminal law.  It is true that one can mistreat
another just for the sake of mistreatment and not as a means to achieve
 48. See Tatjana Hörnle, Criminalizing Behaviour to Protect Human Dignity, 
6 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 307, 314 (2012). See also the decision of the Federal Administrative 
Court of Germany [BVerwGE] in the so-called Peep Show case, where the court invoked
human dignity as an objective, inviolable valuewhich overrides personal autonomyin
order to justify the prohibition of consensual acts of adult women in the shows.
Bundesverwaltungsgericht [BVerwGE] [Federal Administrative Court] 64, 274, Dec. 15, 
1981. 
49. For the notion of human dignity (Menschenwürde) as an objective value in
German constitutional law, see Art.1 par 1. in conjunction with Art. 3 par. 1 of the German 
Basic Law (Grundgesetz).  This interpretation of human dignity as an objective constitutional
value can be deduced from Article 1 par. 3 GG, which provides that “The following basic 
rights shall bind the legislature, the executive and the judiciary as directly applicable law.”
The absence of such a provision for human dignity, together with the provision of Article 
1 par. 1, which defines human dignity as inviolable could lead to the definition of human
dignity as an objective value, which can be used for the interpretation of the constitution 
itself and the of the other subjective rights.  See also Horst Dreier, Kommentierung von
Art. 1 GG, in GRUNDEGESETZ KOMMENTAR 470–72, para. 116–20 (2004). 
50. See  IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 38 
(Mary Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1998) (1797) (“The practical imperative
will therefore be the following: So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person
or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.”).  
For the endorsement of the “Object Formula” in the German constitutional legal doctrine,
see  Dürig G., Der Grundrechtssatz von der Menschenwürde, Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts
81, 117–157 (1956). See also Dreier supra note 49, at 167–168, for criticisms of the object 
formula. See also BVerfGE 27, 1 (1969); BVerfGE 65, 1 (1983); BVerfGE 45, 187 
(1977); BVerwGE 64, 274 277–280 (1981); BVerwGE 84, 314 317ff (1990). 
51.  R.A. Duff, Harm and Wrongs, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 13, 43–44 (2001). 
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other goals.52 It is also too broad, in the sense that not all cases of treatment
of a person as means constitute grounds for criminalization, given for example 
the practice in modern economies. 
Duff continues:
But if we then recognize the inadequacy of a Kantian conception of humanity, 
which focuses only on our autonomy as formally rational beings, and develop a 
richer conception that does justice to the morally significant aspects of our nature
as social, embodied and impassioned beings, we will see that there are more ways
to deny or radically fail to respect humanity than by violating autonomy. We will
then also see that we therefore have good reason—reason of the same kind as we
have to criminalize violations of autonomy—to criminalize other modes of conduct 
that deny or radically fail to respect the humanity of those against or on whom 
they are perpetrated.53 
For the purposes of criminal law, one needs a less austere and a much 
richer conception of human dignity.  This dignity conception would focus 
on the equal moral worth of all persons and on the claims that others have 
on our respect and concern as our fellow human beings. This concept would
shift the focus from what humans are to what we ought not do to each 
other, as Hörnle pointedly notes.54 
This richer conception would require one to define dignity not solely as 
an objective value, an innate self-evident quality of all human beings totally
independent and prior to autonomy rights, but also to explain why dignity
should be protected as a subjective right.  If we understand dignity as a 
value that can never be lost, then even in cases of severe humiliation or
severe setbacks to interests such as torture, the victim can still retain her dignity
and her status as autonomous and rational moral agent.55 Moreover, creating 
reasons for criminalization independent of autonomy rights would leave 
the door open for pure legal moralism and legal paternalism, as it would
generate moral duties against oneself—duties which are rejected even by 
deontic theories of moral obligations—and it would support criminalization
of conduct irrespective of consent.
A more robust concept of human dignity could be developed within a 
coherent theory of autonomy rights serving as a principle independent of
the autonomy principle, but at the same time not taking priority over it, 
thus standing in a horizontal relationship to it.  However, to construe dignity
 52. Hörnle, Criminalizing Behaviour, supra note 48, at 312. 
53. Duff, supra note 51, at 44. 
54. See Hörnle, Criminalizing Behaviour, supra note 48, at 313. 
55. See id. at 314. 
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as an independent value compared to autonomy does not mean that they
do not overlap at all. Indeed, in many constellations disregard for autonomy
would count as dehumanizing conduct.56 On the other hand, to construe
human dignity as an independent value means that the principle of dignity
would therefore justify dehumanizing and degrading conduct, even if the 
actors engage voluntarily in that.
How we are to formulate this principle of dignity? We already rejected 
its nature as solely an objective value and inherent quality of all human
beings.  We also defined it as a principle independent of autonomy rights, 
but not prior to them, as Dan-Cohen claims.  The next step of our inquiry
entails the definition of human dignity as a subjective right and as a 
fundamental interest not to be severely humiliated.57 This definition
requires the formulation of a rights-centered approach, which will be conducted
further. This is important to stress, because construing human dignity as
a subjective right does not mean that it acquires a relational character losing
its objective value. Dan-Cohen provides a definition that goes beyond the
literal meaning of humiliation and acquires an objective symbolic social
meaning. 
Slavery in this view tends to inflict suffering, harm, and disregard, and
this fact has become the basis of a social convention which loads slavery
with symbolic meaning expressing indignity, even when sometimes there
is no suffering, harm, or disregard.  As Dan-Cohen summarizes his point, 
“Once an action-type has acquired a symbolic significance by virtue of 
the disrespect it typically displays, its tokens will possess that significance 
and communicate the same content even if the reason does not apply to
them.”58  Thus, this concept of humiliation is based on this objective social 
meaning, not subjective feelings or beliefs. 
IV. A HUMAN RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH
The aforementioned conception of dignity could be accommodated
within a coherent theory of human rights, creating a holistic approach.
This endeavor requires an inquiry into the philosophy of human rights. 
For the purposes of our inquiry, two salient theories of rights will be
examined.  The two main trends in the philosophy of human rights are
linked with the previously discussed theories of legal perfectionism and 
state neutrality. 
The first prominent theory of rights is an interest-based theory of rights
linked to legal perfectionism.  It concerns a conception of positive liberty
 56. See id.
 57. Id. at 315–16. 
58. DAN-COHEN, supra note 33, at 162. 
416
IFIGENEIA (DO NOT DELETE) 8/16/2018 11:49 AM      
  























   








[VOL. 54:  401, 2017] German Criminal Law
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
that is interest-based, claiming that a person has autonomy interests in
controlling certain domains of her life.59  Individual interests are seen as
generating rights and corresponding duties.60 
The second prominent theory of rights is linked to the principle of state 
neutrality imposing limits on the state when pursuing certain conceptions 
of good, claiming that a person’s autonomy is violated if he is treated on 
the basis of certain impermissible—that is, moralistic or paternalistic— 
considerations.61 These theories of rights are mostly known as liberal-
egalitarian theories.
Interest-based theories of rights balance human rights with collective 
goods, allowing the restriction of rights for the promotion of certain collective
goods.62  Contrastingly, liberal-egalitarian theories do not protect fundamental 
interests of the individual against the demands of the common good, but
they rather serve as trumps, blocking reasons that are based on corrupted 
utilitarian calculations.63  If we treat human rights as trumps, then we 
cannot permit any balance of interests—individual or collective.  In this 
respect, either we understand human dignity as an inviolable objective 
value not to be overridden by other interests—a concept, which we already 
rejected—or as another interest that cannot justify the restriction of liberty 
because it might be based on external preferences.
An interest-based theory of rights can grasp the nature of human dignity
not only as an objective value, but also as a subjective right based on a
fundamental interest not to be severely humiliated.64 This is a fundamental
inter-subjective interest all human beings share, and it can justify criminalization 
even when there is no infringement of autonomy, like in cases of consensual
conduct.
This conclusion leads to the departure from the Harm Principle and its 
substitution by a perfectionist liberal principle that would require the state 
to discriminate, to some extent, between conceptions of the good—and to 
reject those that involve valuing the dehumanization of one’s fellows.  On
 59. See Kai Möller, Two Conceptions of Positive Liberty: Towards an Autonomy-
based Theory of Constitutional Rights, 29 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 757 (2009). 
60. See GEORGE LETSAS, A THEORY OF INTERPRETATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 99–130 (2008). 
61. See Möller, supra note 59, at 757. 
62. RAZ, supra note 35, at 246–47. 
63. See Jeremy Waldron, Pildes on Dworkin’s Theory of Rights, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 
301, 303 (2000); see also Ronald Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 153,
158 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984).
64. See Hörnle, Criminalizing Behaviour, supra note 48, at 315. 
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the contrary, dehumanization of the self would require legal rights against 
oneself, which cannot be imposed by criminal law and for these reasons 
human dignity cannot take priority against autonomy, but instead stands 
in a horizontal relationship with autonomy as an independent value.65 




But how does the aforementioned inquiry into the dignity principle and
the venture to accommodate the principle into a coherent theory of rights, 
creating a holistic rights-based approach, applies to our cases of consensual
maiming and killing and of consensual adult incest? 
As already mentioned, what is common in both cases is the element of 
consent. In the first case though, the conduct has been harmful as it constituted 
a setback to the most essential welfare interest, the interest in continued 
living and physical integrity.  Under a strict application of the Volenti maxim,
and without recourse to the principle of human dignity, this conduct could 
not pass the threshold of criminalization and would not be deemed wrongful, 
since there is no violation of autonomy and thus no wrongful conduct. 
Even if it constitutes a prima facie wrong, then the consent would provide
at least a partial defense to the perpetrator, due to its role as a waiver of 
rights. However, maiming and killing another person in order to devour 
her or for the purpose of sexual gratification is definitely a case of disrespect, 
and the use of the person as a means of sexual gratification that clearly 
denies her equal moral worth.
The second case is a bit more complex because it constitutes a victimless 
crime.  If we set aside all arguments provided by the German Federal
Constitutional Court about the potential harms to the family or the 
children that were born66 and the issue of whether the consent of Suzan 
65. See id.
66. It is remarkable that the Federal Constitutional Court, unlike the European
Court of Human Rights, did not invoke the protection of morals as a candidate for 
criminalization of consensual adult incest. Rather it tried to emphasize the potential harms 
caused by such conduct.  Among the harms mentioned by the court, were concerns about 
the protection of the family institution and eugenics.  Both arguments are rebuttable, since
there are many cases where the family is to be affected by the conduct of its members 
deemed to be immoral, such as the sexual intercourse of homosexual siblings that is not
criminalized under German criminal law.  At any case, there is no clue that non- traditional 
families, such as the one described above are in a lesser degree capable of leading a family
in the same way that other married couples do.  Another concern regards the children born 
and the risk of giving birth to children with disabilities or genetic disorders.  Apart from 
the debate of wrongful birth and the arguments in favor of being born with disabilities 
compared to non-existence, it is also true that similar risks exist in many cases of older 
parents or parents with genetic disorders, where giving birth is definitely not a crime.
Moreover, the actus reus of the offense does not criminalize the outcome of giving birth 
418
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Stübing was valid, we can focus on the argument of ECtHR regarding the 
protection of public morals. 
In this case, if we apply the dignity test, we cannot identify any interest 
of a victim not to be severely humiliated, that could have been violated by
the consensual sexual intercourse between the adult siblings.  This conduct
could be criminalized only by recourse to impure legal moralism due to
the indirect harms caused to other protected legal goods by the conduct— 
this was the line of argumentation of the Federal Constitutional Court in 
Stübing67—or of legal moralism in the broad sense—with regard to the
free-floating evil of a drastic social change.  If this notion of morality is 
endorsed, then it requires a conventional account of morality in contrast 
with a reason-based one. 
As an example of impure legal moralism, I cite the famous Lord Devlin’s
social disintegration thesis. In Devlin’s view, a society is in part constituted 
by its morality and it, therefore, has a right to defend itself against any 
attack on that morality.  The criminalization of kinds of conduct that constitute 
societal taboos, like incest, is a prerequisite of preserving the morality of 
society and hindering its disintegration.68 
This conventional account of morality would preserve taboos and would 
base criminalization on feelings of disgust, indignation, et cetera, which 
have little rational basis.  The same applies to other indirect harms to public
to children or the risk of such an outcome; rather, it sanctions the act of penetration in 
itself, irrespective of the possibility of impregnation.  See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG]
[Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 26, 2008, 2 BvR 392/07, at 1–72; see also Stubing v.
Germany, (2012) 55 E.H.R.R. 24, App. No. 43547/2008. 
67. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb.
26, 2008, 2 BvR 392/07, at 1–72. 
68. Consider the famous 1959 Maccabaean lecture of lord Devlin in favor of 
criminalizing homosexuality and the notorious Hart-Devlin debate.  According to Ronald 
Dworkin, Devlin’s “conclusions fail because they depend upon using ‘moral position’ in
this anthropological sense.” RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 254 (1978).
According to this notion of the moral position, 
this common opinion is compound of prejudice (resting on the assumption that 
homosexuals are morally inferior creatures because they are effeminate), rationalization 
(based on assumptions of fact so unsupported that they challenge the community’s 
own standards of rationality), and personal aversion (representing no conviction 
but merely blind hate rising from unacknowledged self-suspicion). 
Id.  Even if one does not accept Dworkin’s claim that emotional responses cannot be moral 
responses, it is the nature of the feeling of disgust that Devlin endorses as an element of
the common morality, that is particularly susceptible to distortion, and it creates problematic
transferals of subconscious negative attitudes to objects and groups of people.  See MARTHA 
NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME AND THE LAW 87–123 (2004). 
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interests that do not survive scrutiny.  This conclusion would be impermissible
both under an excluded-reasons conception of human rights, as an
impermissible moralistic consideration and under an interest-based theory
of human rights that recognizes the protection of fundamental inter-
subjective interests as the only principled limit to criminal law.  Sexual life 
as the core of intimacy is considered to be not the law’s business, unless 
it interferes with human dignity as a subjective right not to be severely
humiliated.  This can be also deduced from the title of the chapter of the
German penal code which includes most sex offenses, which defines
them as “offenses against sexual autonomy,” indicating the passage from 
a morality-based approach to an autonomy-based approach.69  Consensual 
sexual intercourse among persons who are of legal age that, provided that 
the consent is valid,70 does not set back their welfare interests does not
violate their autonomy or constitute any kind of severe humiliation.  Therefore, 
criminalization on purely moralistic grounds should be avoided.
Finally, in the case of the ECtHR judgment and as far as it concerns the 
nature of human rights as anti-majoritarian rights, there can be no valid
argument in favor of criminalization that would be based on the conventional
moralistic beliefs of the majorities of the Member States.  The ECtHR’s 
decision completely overlooked its role as safeguarding the Right to Private 
Life under Article 8 of ECHR by not invoking any moral arguments in favor 
of its decision, but rather relying on the doctrine of the margin of appreciation 
of the Member States in order for them to apply the conventional moral 
beliefs of their national majorities, without taking into account any substantive 
moral arguments.
VI. CONCLUSION
If we are to locate dignity within a coherent system of human rights,
then this principle would fit better in a system of fundamental inter-
subjective interests, being a value based on a fundamental interest―not 
to be severely humiliated. This approach goes beyond the Harm Principle 
and the Autonomy Principle and constitutes the threshold between permissible 
and impermissible state interference with autonomy rights. 
The element of consent in this context, as an element of the prima facie
or definitive wrong, cannot serve as a waiver of the right not to be severely
humiliated.  Autonomy is one of the two main pillars that stand in the core 
69. See Tatjana Hörnle, Consensual Adult Incest: Α Sex Offense?, 17 NEW CRIM. L.
REV. 76, 86–87 (2014); see also STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], ch. 13, translation 
at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html#p1502 [https://perma.
cc/4R83-FUHZ] (Ger.). 
70. For the conditions of the validity of consent, see Hörnle, Consensual Adult Incest, 
supra note 69, at 86. 
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of our humanity.  Dignity is the second pillar and is in horizontal relationship
with autonomy as an independent value and as a right without being its
source. Any conduct that does not pass this threshold cannot be a sufficient 
reason for criminalization.  This notion of dignity is a moral notion, referring 
to a reason-based morality and a perfectionist theory which would maintain 
its liberal credentials, but at the same time it would not require the state to
remain neutral between various conceptions of the good.  Thus, fostering
human dignity would be a valuable option under this principle that would 
serve both as a limiting principle for autonomy rights, but also as a principled
limit to state coercion.  This reason-based morality would not be based on 
personal feelings of disgust or other irrational feelings, rather than on 
fundamental inter-subjective interests.  The preservation of taboos or 
conventional moral beliefs is not within the scope of criminal law. 
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